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THE THREE STEPS REQUIRED FOR ORIGINALIST
INTERPRETATION: HOW DISTORTIONS APPEAR AT
EACH STAGE
David Crump*
Originalism is often the most satisfactory method of interpreting
texts. But originalism is only one of a number of modalities of
interpretation, all of which have to be kept in mind. Sometimes
originalism is not the best method of reading a text.
Originalist interpretation requires three distinct steps. First, a
court must determine that originalism is the preferred method of finding
meaning in the text at issue. This decision can create problems if
originalism is actually not the method the court plans to use even though
the court has said so. And sometimes the court may decide in the midst
of the process to use parts of another method.
The second step is to find the original meaning. Here, the problem
is that there are many sources one can consult to find this meaning,
ranging from those close to the time of the event to those spread over
time. Finally, the third step is to fit the original meaning to the different
circumstances of today. Sometimes, this step receives only casual
treatment, perhaps because the court has already slogged through the
hard work inherent in the first two steps and implicitly finds this
accomplishment enough. Sometimes the differences are so great that
originalism cannot reliably be used.
The only way to deal with these problems is for the court to try its
way through the process, retaining an awareness of the difficulties in
each step and the possibility of their cumulating.

* A.B., Harvard University; J.D., University of Texas School of Law. John B. Neibel
Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Originalism is often the superior modality for reading texts.1 This
historical method must be understood, however, as only one of many
modalities for the purpose. Professor Bobbitt’s2 list of six methods of
reading the Constitution is one of the most authoritative descriptions of
different modalities of interpretation.3 As this article will argue,
originalism is the method that most often gives satisfactory results,4
although not always.
In Bobbitt’s taxonomy, there are six modalities of constitutional
interpretation: textual, historical, structural, doctrinal, prudential, and
ethical.5 The textual method focuses upon the logic of the language,
while the historical method looks to a past meaning:6 the meaning at the
time of adoption of the language, in the case of originalism. The
structural method seeks to preserve institutions set up by the provisions
at issue, the doctrinal method finds meaning from earlier decisions, the
prudential modality provides a “policy” rationale by considering the
effects of the various interpretations, and the ethical method attempts to
find meaning that has an appropriate moral significance.7
But the point here is that the historical method, and specifically the
originalist modality, often provides satisfactory results.8 Still, all of the
1. See infra Part II.
2. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991).
3. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV.
1771, 1774-75 (1994) (treating Bobbitt’s categories as authoritative).
4. There is authority for the view that originalism is usually the superior method. See
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
5. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 3, at 1775.
6. Id.
7. See BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 12-13.
8. See infra Part II. See also Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2074 (explaining why
originalism is the preferred method of analysis).
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other methods have their places,9 and virtually no one claims that sound
determination of which test to apply is easy.10
The trouble is, however, that the appeal of originalism often comes
wrapped in difficulties that can leave the result vulnerable to
fundamental criticisms.11 The difficulties are hard to avoid. To use an
originalist method of interpretation, one has to go through three discrete
steps.12 First, the interpreter must recognize the need for a reading that
goes beyond the obvious and the literal: a reading, that is, that requires
originalism.13 Second, the reader must figure out the original meaning,
a puzzle that often is confusing.14 Finally, there is the third step:
analogizing the original meaning with the claimed parallels of today.15
All three steps can, in particular cases, be challenging in practice.
This article begins, in Part II, by considering the meaning of
originalism and its potential advantages. This section describes different
ways of using originalism. The article then moves on to consider the
steps in applying this modality. Part III begins by considering the first
step, recognizing the need for interpretation, and then takes on the
second step: that of assigning an accurate historical meaning to the
doctrines at issue. The next part of this article then sets out the
difficulties inherent in the third step: fitting the historical meaning to the
situations of today.
A final section sets out the author’s conclusions. These include
recognition of the tendency of interpreters to cease their hard work after
generating apparently sound results in step two by figuring out historical
meanings, and then simply finessing the third step by settling on toofacile analogies of historical meanings to modern doctrines. Another set
of conclusions deals with the situations that tend to confuse or frustrate
sound completion of each step and with methods for avoiding
prevarication. These conclusions make clear another thrust of the article,
which is to point out that sometimes, the three steps make originalism so
unpredictable and uncertain that in the end, it may not always furnish the
best method of reading the text.

9. See BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 8-9, 119 (explaining that all six modalities can confer
legitimacy).
10. Id. at 12-13.
11. See infra Part III (describing the steps involved in originalism and the difficulties
inherent in them).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Section III.A.
14. See infra Section III.B.
15. See infra Section III.C.
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It is believed that this description of the three steps is original with
the author. Each step is analyzed here, together with examples showing
how each can lead to dubious results if not properly applied.
II. THE ORIGINALIST APPROACH
In simple terms, originalism means the application of the original
meaning of a doctrine. That is, it uses the general meaning of the
concepts underlying the doctrine at the time of its adoption.16 In
interpreting the Constitution, for example, originalism would call for
applying the understanding that the Framers would have shared about
the doctrines they adopted in 1789.17 In interpreting the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, originalism would require a focus on the general meaning as
understood by the legislators at the time they passed the statute.18
But this simple statement raises a range of subsidiary questions.
One inquiry concerns the precise incident that should concentrate the
search for meaning. Is it the Framers’ settlement of the terms of the
Constitution in Philadelphia that matters, or is it the debates and votes
on ratification?19 Different answers to that question may give different
meanings to an originalist interpretation.20 And then, where does one
find authoritative indications of the meanings that the Founders shared?
Perhaps the answers lie in their debates, although this approach leaves
gaps when only one side of an obviously live controversy draws forth
most of the commentary.21

16. See BOBBITT, supra note 2, at 12-13.
17. That is, during the year of adoption of the Constitution. See, e.g., infra Section III.B.
18. See infra Section III.A for an example.
19. See generally Elliot’s Debates – About, LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
https://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2021) (collecting
sources, including Madison’s notes at the Constitutional Convention and debates in the State
legislatures on ratification).
20. For example, the debates on ratification contain a great deal that explains the Contract
Clause, which prohibits impairment by the States of the obligations of the contracts. The
debates at the Constitutional Convention contain little that explains it, and the economic
purposes of the Clause would not appear if an interpreter looked only to the Convention. See
generally David Crump, The Economic Purpose of the Contract Clause, 66 SMU L. REV. 687
(2013) (analyzing the original meaning of the Clause).
21. Cf. Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. Padilla, 363 P.3d 628, 674-75 (Cal. 2016)
(Liu, J., concurring) (citing 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 176-77 (1881)). In THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, Jonathan Elliot memorialized the unopposed statement of James Iredell in
the South Carolina ratification debates concerning the role of state legislatures in the
amendment process. Id. In spite of lack of real debate, the court in Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Ass’n used Iredell’s statement to resolve issue of power of state legislature to have voters
determine whether to send advisory message to Congress. Id.
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Or perhaps the answers lie in much broader sources, such as
dictionaries of the times.22 One might even conclude that these different
sources call forth analyses that resemble not just different answers, but
different kinds of originalism.23
Then, there are still more diffuse historical approaches that are
related to, if not exactly equivalent to, originalism. For example, an
interpreter might try to discern the historical issue to which a given
doctrine was supposed to supply a solution.24 This method sometimes
tends to elevate the highly specific question at issue, which may have no
close analog today,25 over the greater principles established by the
doctrines at issue, which probably ought to prevail in the interpretation
of a Constitution composed of grandiloquent generalities.26
Textual interpretation, or direct focus on the words and context of
the provision being interpreted, is closely related to originalism,27 and,
in fact, it sometimes is considered a type of originalism.28 After all, the
Framers did not all agree on the terminology they used in their debates,
or on dictionary definitions, or on the desired solutions to divisive
issues.29 Instead, what they agreed on is the texts of the provisions they
adopted. Sometimes, a conclusion about the meaning of a text is
different from a construction resulting from a focus on the original
understanding of the provision adopted. In that situation, a textual
approach may be, but is not necessarily, superior to an originalist one.

22. See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652,
2671 (2015) (consulting several dictionaries written near in time to the Constitution).
23. In shifting from Framers’ debates to the dictionaries, for example, a court consults
not the terms used by the Framers but the meanings observed by others.
24. See infra Section III.C (dealing with the decision in United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400 (2012)).
25. See infra Section III.C (discussing the Jones case in which specific circumstances
were given more weight than general principles).
26. See David Crump, How Do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental
Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 795,
837-38 (1996) (explaining that a constitution ought to be so composed, because a constitution
sets out fundamental principles).
27. Both of these modalities focus upon the doctrine at issue, while other methods use
extrinsic considerations. See Ilya Somin, “Active Liberty” and Judicial Power: What Should
Courts Do to Promote Democracy?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1851 (2006).
28. See id. at 1851-52 (pointing how a Justice of the Supreme Court had conflated the
two methods).
29. See id. at 1832.
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III. THE THREE STEPS REQUIRED FOR ORIGINALIST INTERPRETATION
A. Recognizing the Need for an Originalist Approach (and Using It)
Sometimes the question for interpretation depends on an initial
recognition of the need for an originalist approach. This issue depends
upon a court’s conclusion that interpretation is better resolved by
resorting to originalism than to another method, such as textualism.
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County30 exemplifies
the struggle to decide between these two modalities. The question, there,
was the meaning of the provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibiting employment decisions made on account of “sex.”31 Did that
term encompass differences based on sexual orientation, or did it cover
only those involving gender?32
Justice Gorsuch could have begun the analysis with observations he
had made in Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States,33 which provide a
solid description of the originalist approach:
Written laws are meant to be understood and lived by. If a fog of
uncertainty surrounded them, if their meaning could shift with the
latest judicial whim, the point of reducing them to writing would be
lost. That is why it’s a “fundamental canon of statutory construction”
that words generally should be “interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted
the statute.”34

In fact, the opinion in Bostock suggests this approach as a
beginning.35 This would have seemed to end the inquiry, because there
was no basis for saying that the word “sex” included sexual orientation
in 1964, and the parties agreed to this assumption for the sake of
argument.36
But Justice Gorsuch did not follow his own advice. Instead, his
Bostock opinion pronounces that the originalist approach is “just a
starting point,”37 and it takes a twist that, instead of originalism, wanders
into what seems to be textualism.38 It considers the statute not by what

30. Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
31. Id. at 1738; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k), 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964).
32. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
33. Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
34. Id. at 2074 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
35. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (calling for interpretation “in accord with the ordinary
public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment”).
36. Id. at 1739.
37. Id.
38. The opinion focuses on the language and its meaning today. Id. (“The question isn’t
what ‘sex’ meant, but what Title VII says about it.”).
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the legislators meant by the term “sex” when they wrote it, but rather
what is meant by their words.39 The opinion seems to make the question
resolve itself by the overall logic of the language as used today, not as in
1964.40 A difference based on sexual orientation, Justice Gorsuch
reasoned, necessarily includes a difference based on sex, because
differences in sexual orientation cannot occur absent differences in sex.41
By now, Justice Gorsuch had arrived at a result that seemed most
unlikely to resemble the meaning of the words at the time Congress
enacted the statute.42
The dissenters instead saw a steady reliance on the historical
approach as more appropriate.43 If one considered what was meant
publicly by the term “sex” during the 1960’s, the conclusion would be
clear.44 It did not include sexual orientation.45 The result reached by this
originalist approach, according to the dissenters, was more closely
aligned with the understanding of the legislators.46 Thus, originalism
gave a meaning coinciding with what the adopters of the language
thought they meant, while Justice Gorsuch’s deviation into what appears
to be a textualist approach depended instead on the logic of today,
applied to the language itself. Justice Alito labeled the Bostock opinion
as a “brazen abuse” and as “preposterous.”47
To some commentators, the switcheroo applied by Justice Gorsuch
was not just wide of the mark, but far wide of it. One usually
circumspect source became unusually colorful in describing the Justice’s
“living Constitution trance.”48 This staid commentator, the Wall Street
Journal, went on to speculate that “[a]n alien appears to have occupied
the body of Justice Neil Gorsuch as he wrote Monday’s opinion in
Bostock v. Clayton County, which sometimes happens when Justices
breathe the rarified air of the Supreme Court building.”49

39. Id.
40. Id. at 1740.
41. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (explaining that an employer firing a male employee who
is attracted to men but not a female employee who is attracted to men is discriminating based
on sex).
42. The parties so stipulated. Id. at 1739.
43. “ ‘ [S]ex’ still means what it has always meant.” Id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1755. Justice Kavanaugh also dissented. Id. at 1822
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
48. The Editorial Board, Editorial, Gorsuch v. Gorsuch, WALL ST. J. (June 16, 2020,
7:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/gorsuch-vs-gorsuch-11592350714.
49. Id.
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B. The Second Step: Finding an Original Meaning
If a court first decides upon a historical approach such as
originalism, it must next assign an original meaning to the doctrine at
issue. The Supreme Court’s tortuous path in interpreting the
Confrontation Clause and its exclusion of some hearsay statements in
criminal cases provides an example.50 A textual approach was
impractical in resolving the issue, because the prohibition of hearsay is
not explicit in the clause, and the language requires a large measure of
implication to give it meaning.51 The resultant series of decisions shows
the difficulty of the ostensibly simple exercise involved in assigning an
original meaning to a doctrine of long ago.52
The Confrontation Clause story begins with the Court’s decision in
Ohio v. Roberts,53 which required the Justices to fashion a test for
determining which types of hearsay were excluded by the clause.54
Some kinds of hearsay, such as statements against interest55 by
codefendants, are equivalent to unconfronted witness statements, but
other kinds, such as business records56 and excited utterances,57 hardly
seem to fit that characterization. One type of declaration carried a
substitute for created evidence, while the other did not. The Roberts
Court made the distinction with a relatively clear and workable test.
Hearsay could be admitted in compliance with the Confrontation Clause
if it carried indicia of reliability (or trustworthiness),58 which was a
historical basis for establishing exceptions to the hearsay rule.59
Then came Crawford v. Washington.60 The Court’s prior decisions
about the doctrine of stare decisis61 indicated that Ohio v. Roberts should

50. See generally David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115 (2012) [hereinafter Crump Confrontation] (discussing standards
for interpreting the Confrontation Clause).
51. That is, the interpretive issue is not set forth in the language of the Clause. See
generally id. (discussing the proper interpretation of the Clause).
52. Id. at 116-18 (discussing varied treatment of the Clause).
53. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
54. Id. at 66 (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not exclude hearsay that “bears
adequate ‘indicia of reliability’ ” ).
55. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
56. FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
57. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
59. See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s notes to 1972 proposed rules.
60. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
61. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 120-25 (discussing the Court’s decisions
about departure from stare decisis).
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have been preserved,62 but Justice Scalia’s opinion ignored that issue.63
The main question, said Justice Scalia, was whether the hearsay
statements at issue were “testimonial.”64 This allegedly originalist
meaning, Justice Scalia said, derived from the history of the hearsay rule
as it was treated before the adoption of the Confrontation Clause.65 The
Crawford opinion offered a number of decisional examples in which
Justice Scalia claimed that the outcome depended on whether the
evidence at issue was testimonial, although none of the examples
explicitly made the answer depend on that question.66
Justice Scalia emphasized, as an example, Sir Walter Raleigh’s
Case in which the defendant was accused of conspiring against the
king.67 A principal piece of evidence against Raleigh was a written
statement by a purported witness, Lord Cobham, who was incarcerated
nearby.68 Raleigh objected, arguing that the Crown instead should
produce Lord Cobham as a live witness, but the judges refused.69 From
this precedent, Justice Scalia concluded that the concern of the
Confrontation Clause, and its original meaning, was the exclusion of
“testimonial” hearsay.70
But the opinion shows how slippery, and how subject to
manipulation, the determination of original meaning can be. There was
a second and equally offensive item of evidence at issue in Raleigh’s
Case. This second piece of evidence did not fit Justice Scalia’s theory,
and he simply ignored it. Another witness against Raleigh had repeated
statements allegedly made by an absent and unnamed Portuguese
gentleman, accusing Raleigh of participation in the conspiracy at issue.71
Raleigh again objected: “[B]ut what proof is it against me?”72 And so,
the second item of evidence raised the issue of trustworthiness. The
alleged statement by the unknown and unknowable Portuguese

62. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at
124-27 (discussing absence of factors recognized by the Court for departure from stare
decisis).
63. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 124-27.
64. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
65. Id. at 50-51.
66. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 127-30.
67. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
68. The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, knt. at Winchester, for High Treason, in T.B.
HOWELL, 2 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 15-16, 22-24 (1603); see also DAVID
JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 435-520 (1832); Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 130.
69. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44-45.
70. Id.
71. See JARDINE, supra note 68, at 436.
72. See id.

362

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:61

gentleman lacked any indicia of reliability,73 which was precisely the
deciding issue under Ohio v. Roberts.74 But Justice Scalia was so
determined to overrule that decision that his historical analysis bent the
evidence.
The aftermath of Crawford v. Washington was, in fact, the
introduction of a series of unnecessary and unresolvable dilemmas. If a
victim during an incident of domestic violence calls 9-1-1, are her
recorded statements testimonial efforts to convict the defendant, or are
they excited utterances or contemporaneous statements motivated
instead to escape the victim’s immediate plight?75 Or, if the
admissibility of DNA evidence76 calls for inputs by up to forty different
people, are all of their statements testimonial, so that all of them must be
called to testify?77 These were among the questions the Court faced after
Crawford.78
But the confusion created by Crawford is not the immediate issue;
instead, the problem lies in the second step of originalist interpretation,
that of finding the historical meaning of the doctrines at issue.79 In this
case, the question involved the meaning of the Confrontation Clause as
a limit on hearsay evidence.80 The holding in Ohio v. Roberts was
justified by a long history of decisions calling for indicia of reliability in
hearsay evidence.81 That line of decisions included the principal case
cited by Justice Scalia, if only he had not omitted key aspects of the
case.82 Today, the Court is split in its interpretation of the prohibition of
hearsay by the Confrontation Clause, but it arguably follows an
originalist approach. At least five Justices will exclude evidence that fits
the core concern of the Clause: formal statements of evidence such as
affidavits or depositions by witnesses, offered instead of testimony.83
This approach, actually, is arguably closer to the historical concern than
the complex construction erected by Justice Scalia.84

73. The declarant was unknown, and so were any possible reasons for inferring
reliability.
74. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
75. These issues arose in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829-30 (2006).
76. These issues arose in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 303 (2009) and
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
77. Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 677.
78. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 132-43 (discussing these cases).
79. See supra Section III.B.
80. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
83. See Crump Confrontation, supra note 50, at 150-55 (discussing this outcome).
84. See id. at 154-55 (discussing this possibility).
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In summary, the second step in applying an originalist
interpretation is the finding of an appropriate historical meaning of the
doctrine at issue. Making such a finding can be difficult and debatable.
Sometimes, it is subject to result-oriented manipulation, as it was,
unfortunately, in Crawford.85
C. The Third Step: Fitting the Original Meaning to the Present Day
The third step is sometimes the hardest one. Having decided that
originalism is the best approach, and having discerned an original
meaning that seems convincing, the interpreter now has the task of fitting
that original meaning to the circumstances of the present day.86 The
difficulty lies in making analogies between a simpler time in America
and the complexities of the modern day. Radio and television did not
exist when the First Amendment was adopted, but the original
understanding included the freedom of speech, and therefore, the reader
must attempt to fit this fundamental liberty to these very different
media.87 The differences are fearsome, since the spectrum is limited and
radio frequencies must be assigned by licenses, and they are scarce; and
so, doctrines that fit naturally for newspapers require serious adaptation
to fit the electronic media.88
United States v. Jones89 provides a vehicle for consideration of the
third step. There, the FBI had surreptitiously attached a GPS device to
the undercarriage90 of the defendant’s car.91 This electronic addition
allowed law enforcement officers to track the paths taken by the
defendant and furnished evidence used to convict him of cocaine-related
offenses.92 But the installation of the device did not conform to the

85. This conclusion, result-orientation, follows from Justice Scalia’s failure to consider
whether departure from stare decisis was justified as well as his treatment of the historical
meaning of the Contract Clause, which included omission of contradictions in such authorities
as Raleigh’s Case. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text; see supra notes 66-73 and
accompanying text.
86. See supra Part II (discussing how originalism is determined).
87. The radio spectrum is limited, whereas the quantity of print media is not, and this
difference affects how Government may perceive a need to make radio usage available. Cf.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 n.4 (1969) (discussing effect of limited
spectrum in creating need for regulation). The proliferation of cable channels has changed the
situation, but the fundamental issue remains.
88. See id. at 373-77 (requiring free air time for commentators’ response to personal
attacks by broadcasters).
89. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
90. Id. at 403.
91. The vehicle actually was registered to Jones’s wife, id. at 402, but used by Jones, and
so the GPS device was used to track Jones’s movements, id. at 403.
92. Id. at 402-04.
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warrant that allowed it,93 and therefore the Supreme Court, again per
Justice Scalia, analyzed the case as one in which the Government’s
actions were warrantless.94 The issue was deceptively simple: Did the
use of the GPS monitor amount to a “search?”95
The ostensible guide in such a situation was furnished by the
venerable case96 of Katz v. United States.97 The act was a search, under
this decision, if it intruded upon the defendant’s “expectation of
privacy.”98 If this were the test, the case might be easily solved, because
few of us are concerned with privacy as it is manifested on the underside
of our vehicles,99 and none of us can claim a privacy right to avoid being
seen as we drive our cars.100
But Justice Scalia was more of a history buff than that. He
concluded that the idea of a search, at the time the Fourth Amendment
was adopted, depended more heavily upon property rights than the Katz
test did.101 The Founders, he thought, would have recognized a search
in official conduct that amounted to a trespass.102 The entry upon
another’s property was trespassory even if it was free of harm,103 and
thus, the Jones case included a search by reason of the trespassory nature
of the installation of the GPS device.104
There were, of course, several arguments to the contrary offered by
concurring Justices, whose opinions were really dissents to the trespassequals-search rationale. For example, the “intrusion” was so slight that
it hardly seemed an intrusion at all, and therefore hardly seemed a
trespass.105 The device was not placed inside of the defendant’s
property, but outside of it.106 And the trespass theory was so different
from modern approaches that it seemed not to provide an analogy to the
law of search today.107 In fact, the Katz approach seemed a better
93. Id. at 402-03.
94. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
95. Id. at 402.
96. The importance of the Katz decision is shown by its use throughout “[o]ur later
cases.” Id. at 406.
97. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
98. This test actually comes from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz. Id. at 36061 (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 424-25 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that the intrusion was
“so trivial” that should not affect the outcome).
100. Items visible in public do not create an expectation of privacy. See id. at 408-11.
101. Id. at 404-05.
102. Id. at 405.
103. That is, even if it caused “no damage at all.” Id.
104. Id. at 404.
105. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 424-25.
107. Id. at 420.
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analogy.108 At one point, Justice Alito suggests that a better comparison
would be presented if “a constable secreted himself somewhere in a
coach and remained there . . . to monitor the movements of the coach’s
owner.”109 This possibility would seem to call for a very, very small
constable, if he were equivalent to the GPS.
And there was a difficulty that the members of the Court did not
recognize. Justice Scalia’s solution kept both the trespass theory and the
Katz test in place.110 The result thus created a concept of searches that
was deliberately wider than the concept as it existed at the time the
Fourth Amendment was adopted, and this effect would seem to have
violated the principle of originalism, which tries to keep meaning as it
originally was. Justice Scalia was untroubled, however, by this outcome.
He treats the broadened Fourth Amendment as acceptable if the narrower
one adopted by the Founders was acceptable.111 But covering activity as
a search when it was not a search at the time of the Constitution would
seem to offend originalist thinking just as surely as failing to cover a
search that was so defined at the historical time.
Jones shows the difficulty of the third step in originalism. Justice
Scalia’s logic about the historical analogy of trespass does have force.
But his nonrecognition of the slight nature of the alleged intrusion, as
well as his acceptance of the ill-fitting trespass theory in today’s
treatment of privacy, make the analogy to the present day much weaker.
This kind of difficulty seems likely to haunt originalism claims
frequently, because the circumstances of today are always likely to
represent change, either minor or monumental, from the circumstances
of the Founders’ day.
IV. CONCLUSION
One conclusion to which this discussion points is that the three steps
required for originalist analysis can conspire to produce a result that is
inferior to other possible methods of interpretation. Each stage produces
a certain quantum of ill-fitted applications, and the inevitable off-target
nature of all three can cumulate. And when they do, the degree to which
the result deviates from sound interpretation can be significant. But the
deviation tends to remain unrecognizable, because each step will have
seemed to make sense. A court should be aware of this problem and use
a different modality of interpretation if the end result of originalism does
not make sense. This decision, however, will be difficult to implement.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See id. at 422-24 .
Id. at 420.
See id.
Jones, 565 U.S. at 406 n.3, 420 (2012).
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Sometimes, the most treacherous step will be the third. For one
reason, it is undertaken after the first and second steps have been
navigated with apparent success, and it is natural for the third step, then,
to seem less important. For another reason, changes between the
eighteenth century and today are inevitable and likely to be significant.
And for yet another reason, the fitting of the original meaning to today’s
very different institutions, mores, and customs is impossible to measure
accurately, because it often is done by analogy, as is shown by the
comparison of newspapers of the constitutional time to electronic media
of today. The uncertain application of the long-dead trespass theory in
Jones also demonstrates this effect.
The first step, calling for recognition of the need for originalism,
can draw the interpreter into using the approach when it is not warranted
or failing to use it when it might be the best method. The solution to this
dilemma may be simply to try originalism and to compare it to the result
of another method such as textualism. As for the second step, that of
assigning original meaning to the doctrine at issue, Justice Scalia’s
Crawford debacle suggests a similar approach: a court probably should
attempt multiple methods of finding the original meaning, ranging from
prior doctrine to dictionary definitions of the time. Such an approach in
Crawford probably would have resulted in retention of the simple, but
accurate, test of Ohio v. Roberts, calling for a focus upon indicia of
reliability in the type of hearsay at issue. This doctrine was justified by
a mass of pre-constitutional decisions, including the analysis in the
Raleigh case that Justice Scalia ignored.
Above all, a court could do better in adopting and applying
originalism by retaining an awareness of the three distinct steps inherent
in originalist analysis: first, recognizing the need for originalism;
second, assigning an original meaning to the doctrine at issue; and third,
adapting that meaning to the circumstances of today. With that
awareness, a court can take account of potential distortions at each stage
and of their tendency to cumulate into real deviation from sound
interpretation. And then, only with a degree of humility not always
found in judges who apply originalist methods, can a court make the best
path to originalist, or to nonoriginalist, interpretations of ambiguous
language.

